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1. INTRODUCTION
With its recent judgment in Avotin¸s v Latvia of May 2016, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) arrived at its long-awaited answer to Opinion 2/13 of the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of December 2014.1 In this Opinion,
the CJEU prevented the European Union’s (EU) accession to the European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) by declaring the agreement on the accession
of the EU to the ECHR incompatible with the specific characteristics and autonomy of
EU law. This led to a discussion in the literature as to whether the ECtHR would apply
the Bosphorus doctrine in the post-Opinion era as if nothing had happened.2 According
to this doctrine, the ECtHR presumes that EU Member States do not depart from
their obligations under the ECHR when implementing EU law, because EU law offers
protection equivalent to the ECHR. Many commentators hinted at the possibility that
the ECtHR would drop this presumption following Opinion 2/13 because of the crit-
ical approach of the CJEU towards the ECtHR in the Opinion. This was also based on
a remark of the former President of the ECtHR, Dean Spielmann, that the Opinion
was a ‘great disappointment’.3 It is also telling that the first official contacts between
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1 Avotin¸s v Latvia Application No 17502/07, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 26 May 2016; Opinion 2/13, 18
December 2014.
2 Bosphorus v Ireland Application No 45036, Merits, 30 June 2006.
3 ECtHR, Annual Report 2014 (2015) at 6. Eeckhout mentioned that the relationship between both courts
‘is unlikely to return to the past golden years of mutual respect and cooperation, let alone admiration’: see
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Short Articles & Recent Developments
the CJEU and ECtHR since Opinion 2/13 were only resumed in March 2016 when a
delegation of the ECtHR visited the CJEU.4 The ECtHR, however, chose to uphold
the Bosphorus doctrine in Avotin¸s, a case dealing with the Brussels I Regulation on the
mutual recognition of civil law judgments.5 At first sight, the response of the ECtHR
in Avotin¸s does not seem antagonistic and it seems that the ECtHR avoided entering
into an arms race with the CJEU. Closer scrutiny of the judgment reveals, however,
that this is not entirely true.
This short article examines the ECtHR’s judgment in Avotin¸s and will place it in
the wider context of the relationship between the two highest European courts since
Opinion 2/13. The article will therefore sketch the most notable recent developments
that have had an impact on the relationship between Strasbourg and Luxembourg.
Prior to examining these recent developments, the article will briefly discuss the rela-
tionship between the two courts as it could be characterized before Opinion 2/13
(Section 2). Section 3 examines the developments from the CJEU’s perspective: it
will discuss Opinion 2/13 together with the CJEU’s recent trend of centring its fun-
damental rights case law around the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘Charter’),
rather than around the ECHR. Section 4 tells the story from the perspective of the
ECtHR. It first touches upon the ECtHR’s recent practice of referring to CJEU judg-
ments. It ends with an analysis of Avotin¸s and the way in which the ECtHR applied
the Bosphorus doctrine and dealt with the principle of mutual trust, which the CJEU
referred to as being of ‘fundamental importance in EU law’ in Opinion 2/13.
2 . THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LUXEMBOURG AND STRASBOURG
BEFORE OPINION 2/13
Given that Opinion 2/13 made it impossible to proceed with the EU’s accession on the
basis on which it had been envisaged, the CJEU and the ECtHR must continue to
shape their relationship themselves, as they have always done. They interact mostly
through case law, but also through other channels. The earlier mentioned judgment of
the ECtHR in Bosphorus is of special significance in this regard. Based on a description
of the courts’ interaction, as can be found in the literature and Bosphorus, this Section
characterizes the two court’s relationship before Opinion 2/13.
A. Interaction through Case Law and other Means
In the absence of an EU catalogue of fundamental rights, the CJEU started citing
the rights protected in the ECHR in the mid-1970s.6 This enabled the CJEU to
(2015) 38 Fordham International Law Journal 955 at 990. Likewise Opinion 2/13 ‘may represent a turning
point, and open a new confrontational phase’: see Fabbrini and Larik, ‘The Past, Present and Future of the
Relation between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2016)
Yearbook of European Law 1 at 27; Cherubini, ‘The Relationship between the Court of Justice of the
European Union and the European Court of Human Rights in View of the Accession’ (2015) 16 German
Law Journal 1375 at 1386.
4 CJEU, ‘A Delegation from the European Court of Human Rights Visits the Court of Justice of the
European Union’, Press Release No 25/16, Luxembourg, 7 March 2016. There was thus no formal bilateral
meeting in 2015 pursuant to the normal practice.
5 Council Regulation No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L 12/1.
6 For example, C-36/75 Rutili [1975] ECR 1219 at para 32.
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conclude that fundamental rights constituted general principles of EU law because
they resulted from the constitutional tradition common to the Member States. The
CJEU accorded ‘particular’ or ‘special significance’ to the ECtHR in that regard.7
After the CJEU referred to ECtHR case law for the first time in 1996, such refer-
ences to the ECHR became routine.8 In the 1990s, some inconsistencies between
the fundamental rights case law of the two courts appeared,9 but, later, the CJEU
went so far as to amend its own case law in response to judgments adopted by its
counterpart.10 The CJEU thus not only mentioned Strasbourg case law, it followed it
as well.11 In 2002, it was therefore concluded that the EU court ‘applies the
Convention as if its provisions formed an integral part of Community law’ and, com-
parably, in 2006 that it applies ‘ECHR standards diligently and conscientiously’.12
Indeed, the ECtHR’s case law is the body of ‘foreign’ case law most cited in
Luxembourg.13 Since the entry into force of the Charter in 2009, the key provision
governing the relationship between that document and the ECHR is the ‘homogen-
eity clause’ in Article 52(3), which stipulates that ECHR-corresponding rights in the
Charter must be given the same meaning and scope as those laid down by the
ECHR.14 Article 53 furthermore guarantees a minimum level of protection equiva-
lent to the ECHR.
Correspondingly, the ECtHR has followed and relied upon the Luxembourg case
law to advance or adapt its interpretation of the ECHR.15 In its judgments, the
7 For example, C-47/87 and C-227/88 Hoechst [1989] ECR 2859 at para 13; C-540/03 Parliament v
Council [2006] ECR I-5769 at para 35.
8 C-13/94, P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143 at para 16; Costello, ‘The Bosphorus
Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe’
(2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 87 at 113; Douglas-Scott, ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg,
Strasbourg and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review
629 at 646; Harpaz, ‘The European Court of Justice and its Relations with the European Court of
Human Rights: The Quest for Enhanced Reliance, Coherence and Legitimacy’ (2009) 46 Common
Market Law Review 105 at 108.
9 Lawson, ‘Confusion and Conflict? Diverging Interpretations of the European Convention on Human
Rights in Strasbourg and Luxembourg’ in Lawson and de Blois (eds), The Dynamics of the Protection of
Human Rights in Europe, Vol. III (1994) 219; Fabbrini and Larik, supra n 3 at 7–11. See specifically in the
context of Article 8 ECHR, Rincon-Eizaga, ‘Human Rights in the European Union. Conflict between the
Luxembourg and Strasburg Courts regarding Interpretation of Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights’ (2008) 11 Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional 119 at 119.
10 Costello, supra n 8 at 112.
11 Douglas-Scott, supra n 8 at 650; Harpaz, supra n 8 at 110.
12 Costello, supra n 8 at 114; Jacobs, ‘Judicial Dialogue and the Cross-fertilization of Legal Systems: The
European Court of Justice’ (2003) 38 Texas International Law Journal 547 at 551; Scheeck, ‘The
Relationship between the European Courts and Integration through Human Rights’ (2005) 65 Heidelberg
Journal of International Law 837 at 871; Lock, ‘The ECJ and the ECtHR: The Future Relationship be-
tween the Two European Courts’ (2009) 8 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals
375 at 380.
13 Douglas-Scott, supra n 8 at 650; Harpaz, supra n 8 at 109–10.
14 Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-109/10 P Solvay v Commission [2011] I-10329 at para 252. In addition,
Article 6(3) TEU stipulates that the provisions of the ECHR are general principles. De Witte argued on
this basis that the EU is already bound by the ECHR: see De Witte, ‘The Use of the ECHR and
Convention Case Law by the European Court of Justice’ in Popelier et al. (eds), Human Rights Protection
in the European Legal Order: The Interaction between the European and the National Courts (2011) at 21–2.
15 Jacobs, supra n 12 at 551; Scheeck, supra n 12 at 870.
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ECtHR demonstrates approval of and deference to the CJEU.16 Yet, the ECtHR
does not refer as often to the CJEU as vice versa, although this has changed in the
post-Charter years as is explained in Section 4.A.17 The comparably low number of
references is not surprising, because the CJEU could use Strasbourg case law as an
inspirational source for its fundamental rights protection jurisprudence.18 In 2006,
the ECtHR became more aware of the CJEU and, some years later, it was noted that
its references to Luxembourg seemed to be increasing.19
Besides this judicial dialogue through jurisprudence, the two courts also interact
at bilateral meetings that were (and still are) organized alternately in Luxembourg
and Strasbourg once or twice a year. During these informal meetings, the judges dis-
cuss issues that are of concern to both courts. Other interactions include invitations
to give speeches, for example, on the occasion of the opening of the judicial year,
conferences of joint interest, phone conversations and even private meetings.20
B. The Bosphorus Doctrine
In Bosphorus,21 the ECtHR had to reconcile the fact that Contracting States transfer
sovereign powers to international organizations with their responsibility under the
ECHR for measures taken by them to abide by their international legal obligations.22
To achieve this, the Strasbourg Court formulated the rule that it presumes that a
state has not failed to fulfil its duties under the ECHR when implementing legal obli-
gations flowing from the state’s membership of an international organization, pro-
vided that two conditions have been fulfilled.23 First, the presumption only applies if
the state has no discretion in how to implement these obligations.24 Secondly, the
relevant international organization must protect fundamental rights in a manner
which is equivalent to that for which the ECHR provides.25 The protection must be
equivalent both in respect of the guarantees of substantive fundamental rights (that
is, the substantive requirement) and the machinery for supervising fundamental
rights enjoyment (that is, the procedural requirement).26 Importantly, if fundamental
rights protection is manifestly deficient, the presumption can be rebutted.27
16 Douglas-Scott, supra n 8 at 641, 643; Harpaz, supra n 8 at 115.
17 Douglas-Scott, ibid. at 640.
18 Ibid. at 641.
19 Ibid. at 644; Harpaz, supra n 8 at 114–5; Lock, The European Court of Justice and International Courts
(2015) at 219.
20 Jacobs, supra n 12 at 552; Butler, ‘Interview: A Political Decision Disguised as Legal Argument? Opinion
2/13 and European Union Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2015) 13 Utrecht
Journal of International and European Law 104 at 105.
21 For an elaborate discussion of the facts, see Douglass-Scott, ‘Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret
Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, Application No. 45036/98, Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
(Grand Chamber) of 30 June 2005, (2006) 42 E.H.R.R. 1’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 243;
Kuhnert, ‘Bosphorus – Double Standard in European Human Rights Protection?’ (2006) 2 Utrecht Law
Review 177.
22 Bosphorus, supra n 2 at paras 152–153.
23 Ibid. at para 156.
24 Ibid. at para 157.
25 Ibid. at paras 154–155.
26 Ibid. at para 160.
27 Ibid. at para 157.
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In Bosphorus, the ECtHR established that the presumption applied to the EU and
found that it could not be rebutted in that case.28 After finding that the alleged viola-
tion was not the result of an exercise of discretion by the domestic authorities, the
ECtHR went on to examine the substantive requirement. It attached considerable
importance to the (then not yet binding) Charter and the CJEU’s case law, which
included extensive references to the ECHR and ECtHR jurisprudence.29 The EU,
furthermore, fulfilled the procedural requirement because individuals are protected
by actions brought before the CJEU by the EU states and institutions. Additionally,
individuals can bring a domestic case to determine whether a state violated EU law,
in which case the CJEU exercises supervision through the preliminary reference pro-
cedure.30 If, conversely, a domestic court does not refer a question to the CJEU,
even though the latter has not yet examined the right in issue, the domestic court
rules without the ‘full potential’ of the supervisory machinery having been de-
ployed.31 In this circumstance, the presumption does not apply.32 Having a supervis-
ory machinery does, therefore, not suffice; it must also be deployed.
In general terms, the application of the Bosphorus doctrine means that the ECtHR
does not scrutinize EU law and that it does not place itself above the CJEU or take
over the CJEU’s role of being arbiter of the validity of EU law.33 The ECtHR thus
shows respect for the CJEU and the autonomy of the EU legal system and prevents
a conflict with Luxembourg.34 To find that the presumption applies, the ECtHR has
relied heavily on the CJEU’s fundamental rights case law and the role of that court in
supervising fundamental rights in the EU.35 Rather than being suggestive of conflict,
the doctrine seems to be ‘suggestive of a desired relationship of comity, or even co-
operation’.36
C. Characterization
The above description points to the European courts’ willingness to listen, defer,
show respect, prevent conflict and perhaps even to cooperate in the era before
Opinion 2/13.37 Maintaining a relationship that is characterized by such a mindset is
in both courts’ interest because conflict could undermine their authority, while refer-
ring to each other possibly reinforces each court’s legitimacy.38 Importantly, this
28 Ibid. at paras 165–166.
29 Ibid. at para 159.
30 Ibid. at paras 161–164; Michaud v France Application No 12323/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 6
December 2012 at para 111.
31 Michaud, supra n 30 at para 115.
32 Ibid. para 115. For instances of cases in which the doctrine was not applied, see section 4.B of this article.
33 Costello, supra n 8 at 88, 103.
34 Lock, supra n 19 at 180, 218.
35 Costello, supra n 8 at 102. See for a highly critical discussion of the judgment and doctrine: Besselink,
‘The European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights after the Lisbon Treaty: From
Bosphorus Sovereign Immunity to Full Scrutiny?’ in Sabitha (ed.), State Immunity: A Politico-Legal Study
(2009).
36 Douglass-Scott, supra n 21 at 249. See also Lock, supra n 19 at 177–8, 180, 218.
37 Costello, supra n 8 at 89; Scheeck, supra n 12 at 871; Harpaz, supra n 8 at 115; Lock, supra n 19 at
177–8.
38 Douglas-Scott, supra n 8 at 664.
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mindset is primarily based on comity, more than on a legal duty;39 this means that
they can both change their mind when they wish.40 The character of the courts’ fu-
ture relationship, therefore, remains uncertain.41 To illustrate, it is interesting to re-
call that from interviews, held in 2004 at both courts, it transpired that ‘in Strasbourg
an unspoken concern about the EU remains and in Luxembourg some officials like
to speculate on what will happen if the Charter enters into force, whereas in
Luxembourg everyone fears that one day Strasbourg could declare void an ECJ
decision’.42
3 . LUXEMBOURG AND STRASBOURG: OPINION 2/13 AND
CHARTER CENTRISM
The first cracks in the courts’ relationship appeared in December 2014 with Opinion
2/13. Opinion 2/13 has been extensively analysed and discussed. It is not the purpose
of this article to repeat the arguments made.43 Instead, it will concentrate on the in-
sights the Opinion can give into the relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR.
A. Opinion 2/13 and the CJEU’s Distrust towards the ECtHR
Importantly, Opinion 2/13 uncovers the concerns in Luxembourg about the some-
times far-reaching judgments of the ECtHR which could undermine the effectiveness
of EU law.44 This tension has become particularly visible in the Area for Freedom,
Security and Justice, especially in cases dealing with, for example, the Dublin
Regulation and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). It is mainly in this area that
the CJEU has to balance, on the one hand, the uniformity, primacy and effectiveness
of EU law and a system based on mutual trust and mutual recognition, with, on the
other hand, fundamental rights concerns. By contrast, the ECtHR’s sole objective is
to guarantee fundamental rights. When pursuing this objective, it is arguable that the
ECtHR does not always take the particularities of EU law sufficiently into account,
including first and foremost mutual trust, at least in the eyes of some CJEU judges,
and re´ferendaires.45 Judgments of the ECtHR, such as M.S.S. v Belgium and Tarakhel
v Switzerland, can thus be difficult for the CJEU to square with EU law. It is thus not
39 See, however, Article 52(3) Charter and Article 6(3) TEU.
40 Lock, supra n 12 at 381.
41 Scheeck, supra n 12 at 873.
42 Ibid. at 872.
43 See especially ‘Special Section – Opinion 2/13: The E.U. and the European Convention on Human
Rights’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 105–46; Storgaard, ‘EU Law Autonomy Versus European
Fundamental Rights Protection—On Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR’ (2015) 15 Human
Rights Law Review 485.
44 Lock, ‘The Future of the European Union’s Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights
after Opinion 2/13: Is It Still Possible and Is It Still Desirable?’ (2015) 11 European Constitutional Law
Review 239 at 259; Groussot, Hettne and Petursson, ‘General Principles and the Many Faces of
Coherence: Between Law and Ideology in the European Union’ in Studies of the Oxford Institute of
European and Comparative Law Vol 21 (2016).
45 Krommendijk conducted 20 interviews with judges, re´fe´rendaires and AGs at the CJEU in December 2014
about the how and why of citing the case law of the ECtHR in CJEU judgments: see Krommendijk, ‘The
Use of ECtHR Case Law by the Court of Justice after Lisbon: The View of Luxembourg Insiders’ (2015)
22 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 812 at 831. See also Groussot et al., supra n
44 at 24.
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surprising that there have been divergences between the courts, as noted by some
commentators.46 In those judgments, the ECtHR examined whether the return of an
asylum seeker from one Member State to another on the basis of the Dublin
Regulation, which is built on the idea of mutual trust between EU Member States,
was consistent with the ECHR despite deplorable asylum conditions in the receiving
Member State. The ECtHR held that such trust should be rebuttable.47
The CJEU’s uneasiness towards the ECtHR is also visible in Opinion 2/13. In the
Opinion, the CJEU granted the principle of mutual trust constitutional status by
referring to it as being of ‘fundamental importance in EU law’.48 The CJEU subse-
quently determined that accession is problematic because it would treat the EU and
the Member States in their relations with each other as ‘normal’ ECHR Contracting
Parties. The CJEU added that the requirement under the ECHR to check another
Member State’s observance of fundamental rights despite mutual trust ‘is liable to
upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law.’49
The CJEU thus essentially tried to withhold parts of EU law from the scrutiny of the
ECtHR, thereby preventing future M.S.S. or Tarakhel rulings that could affect the ef-
fectiveness of EU law.50
B. The CJEU’s References to the ECtHR: Increasing Charter Centrism
Opinion 2/13 also implies that the CJEU is reluctant to tie its own hands to the
ECtHR. Rather, it wants to remain in control itself and reserve the possibility to give
its own divergent interpretation of fundamental rights’ norms.51 In Kadi I, the CJEU
described the EC Treaty as ‘an autonomous legal system which is not to be preju-
diced by an international agreement’.52 In Opinion 2/13, the CJEU built on this for-
mulation and held that ‘the autonomy enjoyed by EU law . . . requires that the
interpretation of those fundamental rights be ensured within the framework of the
46 The CJEU followed suit in N.S., but it applied a seemingly stricter ‘systemic deficiencies’ test instead of
looking at the individual’s ‘real risk’ of inhuman or degrading treatment as the ECtHR does: see C-411/
10 and C-493/10 N.S. and Others [2011] I-13905; Den Heijer, ‘Joined Cases C-411 & 493/10NS v
Secretary of State for the Home Department and ME v Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for
Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2011’
(2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 1735 at 1747; Costello, ‘Human Rights and the Elusive Universal
Subject: Immigration Detention under International Human Rights Law’ (2012) 19 India Journal of
Global Legal Studies 257 at 271.
47 M.S.S. v Belgium Application No 30696/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 21 January 2011; Tarakhel v
Switzerland Application No 29217/12, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 4 November 2014.
48 Opinion 2/13, supra n 1 at para 191; Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice’, Fourth Annual Sir Jeremey Level Lecture, University of Oxford (2015) at 6,
available at: law.ox.ac.uk [last accessed 21 December 2016]; Gaspar-Szilagyi, ‘Joined Cases Aranyosi and
Caldararu: Converging Human Rights Standards, Mutual Trust and a New Ground for Postponing a
European Arrest Warrant’ (2016) 24 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice
197 at 204.
49 Opinion 2/13, supra n 1 at para 194.
50 Eeckhout, supra n 3 at 969; Groussot et al., supra n 44 at 24. In addition to N.S., there have been other
cases in which asylum seekers challenged the Dublin system as being inconsistent with the Charter. For
example, C-394/12 Abdullahi 10 December 2013. See also the still pending cases of C-155/15 Karim and
C63/15 Ghezelbash.
51 Harpaz, supra n 8 at 110.
52 C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi [2008] I-06351 at para 316.
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structure and objectives of the EU’.53 Opinion 2/13 could thus be interpreted as an il-
lustration of the increasing Charter centrism and the tendency in the CJEU to au-
tonomously interpret the Charter without reference to the ECHR and the case law
of the ECtHR, a trend that can be contrasted with the CJEU’s past practice.54 For
CJEU judges and re´fe´rendaires, citing Strasbourg less often is a way to underline the
importance, the autonomy and the higher level of protection of the EU’s ‘own cata-
logue’ of fundamental rights.55
After Opinion 2/13, the CJEU has indeed chosen to rely exclusively on the
Charter in several judgments, even though there are still some judgments in which
the case law of the ECtHR plays a large role.56 This is a trend that had started before
Opinion 2/13, but it might have become more pronounced after Opinion 2/13. The
case law of the ECtHR is cited in a more reserved way without referring to it as ‘a
source of inspiration’ or being of ‘special significance’.57 In addition, the tone of the
CJEU has become more formal. A particularly good illustration of the latter is the
Grand Chamber judgment in J.N. about the detention of asylum seekers in the con-
text of their deportation for reasons of public order and security. In J.N., the CJEU
added that the review of the validity of EU secondary law ‘must be undertaken solely
in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter’.58 The CJEU went
two steps further than its previous fundamental rights case law. First, by using the
language of obligation (‘must’) and, secondly, by referring to the Charter in gen-
eral.59 The CJEU also tried to minimize the effects of Article 52(3) of the Charter. It
held for the first time, on the basis of the Explanations to the Charter, that consist-
ency between the Charter and the ECHR should only be arrived at ‘without thereby
adversely affecting the autonomy of Union law’ and its own.60
Charter centrism is particularly visible in judgments in which the CJEU does
not refer to the case law of the ECtHR, even though a case was suitable for it. Such
a possibility especially exists when the AG discusses ECtHR case law,61 or
when referring to national courts or the parties explicitly signal relevant Strasbourg
53 Opinion 2/13, supra n 1 at para 170.
54 Lenaerts and Gutie´rrez Fons, ‘The Place of the Charter in the EU Constitutional Edifice’ in Peers et al.
(eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (2014) at para 55.26.
55 Interviews as discussed in Krommendijk, supra n 45 at 832. See also De Burca, ‘After the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator’ (2013) 20 Maastricht Journal
of European and Comparative Law 168 at 174–6; Bartolini and Biondi, ‘Life as a Human Rights Court:
Challenges and Developments in the EU Courts Activity in 2014’ (2016) 22 European Public Law 3 at
24; Eeckhout, supra n 3 at 990; C-617/10 A˚klagaren v Hans A˚kerberg Fransson 26 February 2013, at para
87.
56 For an overview, see Krommendijk, ‘The CJEU’s Reliance on the Case Law of by the ECtHR since 2015:
Opinion 2/13 as a Game Changer?’ in Bribosia and Rorive (eds), Towards a Global and Integrated
Approach of Human Rights: Promises and Challenges (2016).
57 Cf with supra nn 6 and 7.
58 C601/15 PPU J.N. 15 February 2016, at para 46. See subsequently C-543/14 Ordre des Barreaux
Francophones et Germanophone and Others 28 July 2016, at para 23.
59 Earlier, the CJEU only held this in relation to specific provisions. First, in relation to Article 47 and later
also 17, 7, 10 and 11 of the Charter. C-386/10 P Chalkor v Commission [2011] ECR I13085 at para 51;
C398/13 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami 3 September 2015, at para 46.
60 See subsequently also C-294/16 PPU JZ 28 July 2016, at para 50.
61 For example, AG Sharpston in C-543/14, Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophone and Others
28 July 2016.
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judgments.62 One example is Schrems about the Commission’s US Safe Harbour de-
cision and data protection, where the CJEU only cited its own judgments, including
its landmark judgment in Digital Rights.63 The Grand Chamber judgment in Delvigne
provides another illustration. This case dealt with a reference for a preliminary ruling
about French legislation depriving persons convicted of serious crimes of their right
to vote. While Advocate General (AG) Cruz Villalon held that this case ‘brings to
mind immediately the case law of the [ECtHR]’, which he lengthily examined, the
CJEU only relied upon the Charter.64
The focus on the Charter instead of on the ECHR and ECtHR jurisprudence is
also visible in CJEU judgments where Strasbourg is only referred to at the end as
some sort of afterthought or crosscheck. The case law of the ECtHR does not seem
to form part of the considerations leading to the interpretation of Charter provisions,
but is only used by the CJEU to support the conclusions it already arrived at inde-
pendently. J.N. is again the best example of a judgment in which the ‘Strasbourg-
check’ of the CJEU’s analysis is included as a ‘by the way’ note (‘Finally, it must be
recalled that. . .’) after an extensively analysis of Article 6 of the Charter (the right to
liberty) and a detailed proportionality assessment in the context of Article 52(1) of
the Charter.65 A similar approach was taken in JZ where the Polish court referred to
the case law of the ECtHR in relation to Article 5 of the ECHR and the CJEU felt
compelled to devote some paragraphs to several ECtHR judgments, albeit in a rather
selective way, in order to confirm its own Charter-based interpretation.66
As noted, there have been some exceptions to Charter centrism and, in many
judgments, the CJEU still refers to the ECtHR and tries to align its own interpret-
ation with the Strasbourg court.67 One recent example is Aranyosi. This case is par-
ticularly interesting, especially in the light of the CJEU’s earlier statements on mutual
trust in Opinion 2/13. Aranyosi concerned the admissibility of surrender of a
Hungarian national by the Austrian judicial authorities to Hungary, where the prison
conditions are deplorable. It dealt with the EAW Framework Decision and its ex-
haustive list of grounds for refusal, which does not explicitly provide for refusal in
case of breaches of fundamental rights. There is only a general reference to funda-
mental rights in Article 1(3) in the sense that the Directive ‘shall not have the effect
of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights’. AG Bot did not refer to
the homogeneity clause of the Charter (Article 52(3)) and adopted a rather narrow
textual reading of the Decision, emphasising the limited grounds for non-execution,
which favoured the effectiveness of the system set-up by the EAW Framework
Decision. The CJEU, however, opted for a more fundamental rights and ECHR
62 For example, C-615/13 P, Client Earth 16 July 2015, at para 29.
63 C362/14, Schrems 6 October 2015, at para 193.
64 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalon in C-650/13, Delvigne 6 October 2015, at para 109.
65 The CJEU could almost not avoid reflecting upon the case law of the ECtHR, because the referring
Dutch court explicitly relied on particular judgments of the ECtHR in its reference: see J.N., supra n 58 at
paras 50–77; and interviews as discussed in Krommendijk, supra n 45 at 832.
66 JZ, supra n 60 at para 21.
67 For example, Case C-205/15, Toma 30 June 2016; C-583/13 P, Deutsche Bahn and Others v Commission
18 June 2015.
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consistent reading of the EAW, to the delight of many observers and academics.68
The CJEU stipulated, with references to Strasbourg case law, that the execution of a
EAW must be postponed (but not abandoned altogether) if there is a real risk of in-
human or degrading treatment for the individual concerned because of deficient de-
tention conditions in the requesting Member States.69 Aranyosi thus illustrates that
the CJEU is carefully avoiding a direct clash with the ECtHR and even tried to, ac-
cording to Gaspar-Szilagyi, ‘heal some of the wounds created by Opinion 2/13’.70 In
earlier cases such as N.S. and Abdullahi, the CJEU had applied a seemingly stricter
test (of ‘systemic deficiencies’) rather than the test which the ECtHR applies (look-
ing at the individual’s ‘real risk’ of inhuman or degrading treatment).71 In Aranyosi,
the CJEU also opted for the latter. This judgment might thus be some sort of gesture
of comity towards the ECtHR, possibly in anticipation of the ECtHR’s ruling in
Avotin¸s.72
This short overview shows that the CJEU has recently been citing Strasbourg less
and in a more reserved way, while also being more critical about the necessity to do
so. This does not, however, mean that the CJEU has entered into open warfare. The
changing tone is subtle and at the same time partly masked by many judgments, such
as Aranyosi, which still give the ECHR and ECtHR jurisprudence a prominent role.73
4 . STRASBOURG AND LUXEMBOURG: CONTINUED REFERENCES
AND CRITICAL REAFFIRMATION OF THE BOSPHORUS DOCTRINE
Strasbourg insiders have looked at the recent developments in Luxembourg with
some unease and frustration. The reactions to Opinion 2/13 were downright critical.
As noted in the introduction, Dean Spielmann stated that it was ‘a great disappoint-
ment’. He added that ‘the principal victims will be those citizens whom this opinion
. . . deprives of the right to have acts of the European Union subjected to the same
external scrutiny as regards respect for human rights as that which applies to each
Member State’.74 Likewise, a recent report on the future of the ECHR by the
Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) referred to the ‘growing import-
ance of the Charter . . . to the detriment of the Convention’ in the CJEU’s case
law.75 These Strasbourg perceptions have been interpreted by some as a growing
68 See, for example, Fair Trials Letter to the Commisssioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality of
the European Commission, ‘AG’s Bot Opinion in Aranyosi and Caldararu. A Threat to Justice in Europe’,
10 March 2016, available at: fairtrials.org [last accessed 21 December 2016]; Gaspar-Szilagyi, supra n 48
at 205–6.
69 C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Caldararu 5 April 2016, at paras 86–91.
70 Gaspar-Szilagyi, supra n 48 at 217–8.
71 Den Heijer, supra n 46.
72 One interviewed CJEU insider noted that a reason to explicitly cite the ECtHR is to show Strasbourg
that the CJEU still deserves the Bosphorus presumption. Another interviewee, however, held that the
CJEU is not referring to the ECtHR to make judges in Strasbourg happy. For a discussion of those inter-
views, see Krommendijk, supra n 45 at 826.
73 The different approaches of the CJEU stem from the absence of a uniform practice or methodology and
can primarily be attributed to the composition of a Chamber and the dynamics within a certain forma-
tion: see ibid. at 816–7.
74 ECtHR, supra n 3.
75 CDDH, ‘Report on the Longer-term Future of the System of the European Convention on Human
Rights’, CM(2015)176-add1final, 3 February 2016, at para 179.
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eagerness on the part of the ECtHR to critically take stock of EU law. This section
will analyse how the ECtHR has dealt with EU law in this context since Opinion 2/
13.
A. The ECtHR’s References to the CJEU
In light of the CJEU’s Charter centrism, the question can be posed whether the
ECtHR’s references to the CJEU case law on the Charter and the Charter itself have
decreased since the latter delivered Opinion 2/13. This seems to be an unlikely devel-
opment, as the ECtHR actually started to refer to EU law more when the Charter
came into play, and even more when it became binding.76 This hypothesis is con-
firmed by a quick scan of Strasbourg references to the Charter in the (approxi-
mately) 19-month periods of 4 May 2013 to 17 December 2014 and 18 December
2014 to 2 August 2016 (the Opinion was adopted on 18 December 2014).77 In the
first period, the ECtHR referred to the Charter seven times in the ‘relevant interna-
tional documents’ section of its judgment and made five references in both that sec-
tion and ‘the law’ section. These figures are, respectively, 17 and four for the more
recent period, in which the ECtHR made references in just the ‘the law’ section two
times. Although the implications of this review are limited because it only looks at
Charter references and not other relevant legislation or Luxembourg case law, it does
show that the ECtHR does not seem to respond to Opinion 2/13 by decreasing the
number of references to EU law. It should also be noted that any sustained change
would be hard to pinpoint, because the Strasbourg Court does not refer to its
Luxembourg counterpart very often anyhow.78
It is only logical that the Luxembourg trend is not mirrored in Strasbourg, be-
cause with the Charter—the EU’s own fundamental rights catalogue, the relevance
of the ECHR for the CJEU has decreased, whereas the Charter has made EU law
more relevant to the ECtHR. The Charter, as a comparably modern human rights
treaty, is particularly relevant to the ECtHR because the ECHR ‘is a living instru-
ment, to be interpreted in present-day conditions’.79 The ECtHR can rely upon the
Charter to show contemporary consensus and hence modernize its own treaty.80 In
addition, some provisions in the Charter give a higher level of protection than the
ECHR, which could be beneficial for the ECtHR to bolster its own case law.81
Another explanation for why it is not logical that the trend would be mirrored in
Strasbourg is that the CJEU’s case law has increased in relevance for the ECtHR as
the CJEU has been seized with more cases in which fundamental rights play an
76 Lock, supra n 19 at 214–5. See ‘Introduction’ in Lock, ‘The influence of EU law on Strasbourg Doctrines’
(2016) 41 European Law Review 804 at 806.
77 Two different searches were conducted on HUDOC for the periods mentioned above. The following
search terms were used: ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights’ and ‘Charte des droits fondamentaux’. Only ref-
erences to the document by the ECtHR were taken into consideration and not references by the parties
or in a separate opinion.
78 See section 2.A of this article.
79 X. and Others v Austria Application No 19010/07, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 19 February 2013 at para
139.
80 Lock, supra n 19 at 214–5; Lock, supra n 76.
81 Spielmann, ‘Foreword’ in Dzehtsiarou et al. (eds), Human Rights Law in Europe (2014) i at vii–xxi.
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important role after the entry into force of the Charter.82 In sum, even though
Opinion 2/13 was unwelcome to the ECtHR, it has not changed the potential rele-
vance of EU law to it.
B. The Bosphorus Doctrine after Avotin¸s
As was noted in Section 2, the Bosphorus doctrine can be interpreted as an expression
of the good relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR. Opinion 2/13 may, how-
ever, have troubled that relationship and, as was indicated in the introduction, the
question therefore arose whether the ECtHR would continue to apply the doctrine
to the EU. This question became pertinent because President Spielmann stated that,
with accession blocked, ‘[m]ore than ever . . . the onus will be on the Strasbourg
Court to do what it can in cases before it to protect citizens from the negative effects
of this situation.’83 This section answers that question and, more generally, scruti-
nizes the judgment from the perspective of the relationship between the two courts
since Opinion 2/13.
Different scenarios as to what the ECtHR would do with the Bosphorus doctrine
after Opinion 2/13 were possible.84 The first scenario was that the ECtHR would
apply the doctrine in the post-Opinion era as if nothing had happened. Some con-
sidered that scenario as unlikely because Opinion 2/13 ‘revealed a potentially dismis-
sive approach by the CJEU vis-a-vis the ECtHR, and the unwillingness of the former
to subject itself to external review by the latter’.85 Two other scenarios were also pos-
sible. Most unrealistically, the ECtHR could decide to no longer apply the Bosphorus
doctrine to the EU.86 More realistically, it could apply the doctrine more strin-
gently.87 The scenario where the ECtHR would abandon the doctrine is unrealistic,88
because the doctrine suggests that the EU provides equivalent protection for funda-
mental rights and Opinion 2/13 does not change this. On the contrary, now that the
Charter has become binding, the (CJ)EU is probably more aware of the importance
of protecting fundamental rights than ever.89 The CJEU’s Charter centrism does not
necessarily invalidate this proposition, because the ECtHR demands ‘not identical
but “comparable”’ protection.90 Therefore, even if Charter centrism would mean that
the protection standards are merely comparable, the doctrine can still be applied
82 Lock, supra n 76.
83 ECtHR, supra n 3.
84 See also Fabbrini and Larik, supra n 3 at 28.
85 Ibid. See also Mole, ‘Can Bosphorus be Maintained?’ (2015) ERA Forum 467 at 480.
86 See also Polakiewicz, ‘Speeches of the Director, Directorate of Legal Advice and Public International
Law: The Future of Fundamental Rights Protection without Accession’, 26 June 2015, available at: coe.int
[last accessed 21 December 2016]; Morijn, ‘After Opinion 2/13: How to Move on in Strasbourg
and Brussels?’ EUtopia law, 5 January 2015, available at: eutopialaw.com [last accessed 21 December
2016].
87 See also Butler, supra n 20 at 108; Lock, ‘Will the Empire Strike back? Strasbourg’s Reaction to the
CJEU’s Accession Opinion’, VerfBlog, 30 January 2015, available at: verfassungsblog.de/will-empire-
strike-back-strasbourgs-reaction-cjeus-accession-opinion/ [last accessed 21 December 2016]; Fabbrini
and Larik, supra n 3 at 29.
88 See also Butler, supra n 20 at 108.
89 See also Berge´, ‘Avotins ou le calme qui couve la tempe^te’, GDR CNRS ELSJ, 26 May 2016, available at:
gdr-elsj.eu [last accessed 21 December 2016].
90 Michaud, supra n 30 at para 103.
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and, in the event that the standards diverge more drastically in the future, the
ECtHR can always find that the presumption is rebutted. Moreover, preventing con-
flict remains in both courts’ interest.91
With Avotin¸s, the unrealistic scenario did not materialize: the ECtHR applied the
Bosphorus doctrine.92 Did the ECtHR nevertheless apply the doctrine in a stricter
fashion than it had before? Because there are only very few rulings in which the
Bosphorus doctrine plays a role, it is hard to give a definite answer.93 Nevertheless,
the four other decisions in which the ECtHR applied the doctrine to the EU, as well
as Bosphorus itself, provide some material for comparison, as do the cases in which
the Bosphorus doctrine was eventually not applied to the EU. Furthermore, a close
consideration of the judgment makes it possible to draw some conclusions.
In the decisions in Mayenne and Biret, the ECtHR presumed equivalent protection
mainly with reference to Bosphorus.94 In the decision in Kokkelvisserij, it held that the
sole fact that the applicant could not respond to the AG’s opinion in preliminary rul-
ing proceedings did not make the protection afforded manifestly deficient, meaning
that the presumption was not rebutted.95 Lastly, in the decision in Povse, the ECtHR
assumed there was no discretion because the CJEU had ruled so. Furthermore, the
ECtHR did not consider it problematic that the CJEU had not dealt with the alleged
violation in a preliminary ruling, because the CJEU had stipulated that it was for do-
mestic courts to protect the rights of individuals in the relevant context and because
the applicants had not invoked their rights before domestic courts even though they
could have done so.96 These decisions affirm, as was also concluded in Section 2,
that the ECtHR approves of how the CJEU discharges its task, avoids stepping in
the CJEU’s shoes and defers to the CJEU’s findings.97 In some other EU-related
cases, the ECtHR discussed the possibility of applying the Bosphorus doctrine, but
eventually decided against it. One example is the earlier mentioned case of M.S.S.
where there was discretion for EU Member States in the implementation of their EU
law obligations.98 Importantly, the ECtHR did not reach this decision because of a
fundamental rights flaw in the EU. These other cases, therefore, also do not disclose
any firm criticism by Strasbourg of Luxembourg.
91 See also Fabbrini and Larik, supra n 3 at 30, 35; Section 2.C of this article.
92 Avotin¸s, supra n 1 at para 125.
93 The doctrine can also be applied to other international organizations than the EU (cases in which the
Court applied the doctrine to other international organizations were not taken into consideration in this
article), see Ryngaert, ‘Oscillating between Embracing and Avoiding Bosphorus: The European Court of
Human Rights on Member State Responsibility for Acts of International Organisations and the Case of
the European Union’ (2014) European Law Review 176.
94 Coope´rative des agriculteurs de Mayenne v France Application No 16931/04, Decision, 10 October 2006;
Biret v 15 States Application No 13762/04, Decision, 9 December 2008.
95 Kokkelvisserij v The Netherlands Application No 13645/05, Admissibilty, 20 January 2009.
96 Povse v Austria Application No 3890/11, Admissibility, 18 June 2013, at paras 82, 84–8.
97 See also Lock, supra n 19 at 204.
98 M.S.S., supra n 47; Michaud, supra n 30 (not applied because domestic courts failed to make a reference
for a preliminary ruling); Collony v 15 EU Member States Application No 73274/01, Admissibilty, 9
December 2008; Andreasen v 27 EU Member States Application No 28827/11, Admissibility, 31 March
2015 (not applied because the complaints were really directed against decision of EU institutions).
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(i) The facts
The complaint in Avotin¸s was brought by a Latvian national, who had signed an ac-
knowledgement of debt with a company registered in Cyprus. When he did not re-
pay his debt in time, the company sued him in a Cypriot court. Even though the
applicant had been duly notified of the hearing according to the Cypriot court, he
did not appear. It, therefore, ruled in his absence and ordered him to pay the debt
and interest. Subsequently, the company started proceedings in a Latvian court re-
questing recognition and enforcement of the Cypriot judgment. The first-instance
Latvian court ceded to the company’s request and ordered the recording of a charge
against the applicant’s property in the land register. When the applicant learnt of the
Cypriot judgment and Latvian court’s enforcement order, he only appealed to the
latter, but in vain. The applicant contended that the recognition and enforcement of
the Cypriot judgment in Latvia breached the Brussels I Regulation.99 He argued inter
alia that Article 34(2) of that Regulation had not been abided by. That provision re-
quires that a judgment given in default in another Member State is not recognized if
the defendant was not served with the document instituting the proceedings in suffi-
cient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, ‘unless the
defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was
possible to do so’. Before the ECtHR, the applicant complained that the Latvian
courts had violated Article 6(1) of the ECHR because they had enforced the judg-
ment of the Cypriot court, which was the product of court proceedings that had dis-
regarded his defence rights. A Chamber found that there had been no violation.100
The case was then referred to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR by the applicant
and the Grand Chamber accepted the referral.
(ii) The presumption of equivalent protection: discretion and deployment of the
supervisory mechanism
As for the first condition for applying the Bosphorus doctrine, the ECtHR concluded
that the domestic courts had no discretion to refuse to recognize the Cypriot judg-
ment under Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation. The ECtHR reached this con-
clusion because a ‘fairly extensive body of [CJEU] case-law’ on the provision clarified
that it ‘did not confer any discretion on the court from which the declaration of en-
forceability was sought’.101 As it did in the decision in Povse, discussed above, the
ECtHR assumed that there was no discretion because the CJEU had ruled so.102
Therefore, the ECtHR maintained its deferential stance towards the CJEU on this
point.
The earlier finding of the Chamber, which also concluded that there was no dis-
cretion, was called ‘surprising’ by one observer who proposed that this ‘may have
been one of the reasons why [the case] was referred to the Grand Chamber’.103 This
99 Council Regulation No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L 12/1.
100 Avotin¸s v Latvia Application No 17502/07, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 25 February 2014.
101 Avotin¸s, supra n 1 at para 106 (emphasis added).
102 Ibid.
103 Du¨sterhaus, ‘Judicial Coherence in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Squaring Mutual Trust
with Effective Judicial Protection’ (2015) 8 Review of European Administrative Law 151 at 169.
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observer disagreed with the Chamber’s conclusion and found support in the dissent-
ing opinion of Judges Ziemeke, Bianku and de Gaetano which concluded, with refer-
ence to the ground for refusal in Article 34(2), that ‘the applicable EU law does not
provide for blind automaticity as concerns the execution of judgments’.104 This, how-
ever, as the Chamber and Grand Chamber rightly established, does not mean that
domestic courts also had discretion under Article 34(2), because Article 34(2) pro-
vides that a ‘judgment shall not be recognised’ if certain factual circumstances
apply.105 While domestic courts do not have discretion, they have two options: to ei-
ther recognize a judgment or not (and which option is adopted will depend on the
facts). Domestic courts, therefore, do not have any ‘margin of manoeuvre’,106 as
Member States do have, for example, in the Dublin procedure where the applicable
Regulation provides that they ‘may’ use the ‘sovereignty’ clause.107
As regards the second condition for applying the Bosphorus doctrine, the Grand
Chamber of the ECtHR did not mention the requirement that the EU should pro-
vide comparable substantive fundamental rights guarantees; it only discussed the
procedural requirement and specifically whether the EU’s supervisory mechanism
had been fully deployed.108 The Grand Chamber explicitly downplayed this proced-
ural condition. In Michaud, the ECtHR had determined that the Bosphorus presump-
tion did not apply, because a domestic court had refrained from submitting a
preliminary reference even though the CJEU had never examined the Convention
rights in issue.109 In Avotin¸s, the ECtHR held that this condition should not be
applied with ‘excessive formalism’.110 Rather it stipulated that
it would serve no useful purpose to make the implementation of the Bosphorus
presumption subject to a requirement for the domestic court to request a rul-
ing from the CJEU in all cases without exception, including those cases where
no genuine and serious issue arises with regard to the protection of fundamen-
tal rights by EU law, or those in which the CJEU has already stated precisely
how the applicable provisions of EU law should be interpreted in a manner
compatible with fundamental rights.111
The actual test that the ECtHR subsequently conducted was rather formalistic
and superficial. The ECtHR considered that the applicant had paid insufficient
104 Avotin¸s, supra n 100 at Joint Dissenting Opinion of judges Ziemele, Bianku and de Gaetano, para 4.
105 Emphasis added.
106 Avotin¸s, supra n 1 at para 105.
107 Article 3(2) Council Regulation No 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining
the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States
by a third-country national [2003] OJ 50/1 (emphasis added). See also ibid. at para 107.
108 Avotin¸s, ibid. at para 108. The ECtHR probably does not mention the substantive requirement because
it discusses the content of the matter when contemplating whether the presumption of equivalent pro-
tection can be rebutted.
109 In addition, the ECtHR paid attention to the question whether such a referral was necessary in the light
of the case law of the CJEU. It held that there was such a need because the CJEU had only examined
the obligations for lawyers to report suspicion in the light of the right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR),
but not the rights of the lawyer under Article 8 ECHR: see Michaud, supra n 30 at paras 114–5.
110 Avotin¸s, supra n 1 at para 109.
111 Ibid.
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attention to Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation and its compatibility with fun-
damental rights and had refrained from requesting the Latvian Supreme Court to
make a preliminary reference to the CJEU on this matter. The ECtHR thus con-
cluded that the absence of a reference by the Latvian court was ‘not a decisive factor’
and held that the Bosphorus presumption applied.112
Several observations can be made about the approach of the ECtHR. First, the
formalistic approach taken is nothing new per se, but it is the first time that the
ECtHR explicitly acknowledged that the procedural criterion for the application of
the Bosphorus doctrine should not be applied stringently.113 In doing so, the ECtHR
appeared to align its approach more closely to the case law of the CJEU, because the
quoted fragment implicitly refers to Luxembourg’s CILFIT exceptions to the obliga-
tion for the highest national courts to refer under Article 267 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), including the doctrine of acte e´claire´
and acte clair.114 Secondly, the ECtHR did not—understandably so from its point of
view—examine more substantively whether the Supreme Court had an obligation to
submit a reference for a preliminary ruling of its own motion.115 The ECtHR gener-
ally leaves such questions to the CJEU.116 Thirdly, and most importantly, the
ECtHR placed much emphasis on the question whether there had been a request for
a preliminary reference by one of the parties. This reliance on the (absence of a) re-
quest of one of the parties is in line with the ECtHR’s earlier judgments in Dhahbi
and Schipani in which it established a violation of Article 6(1) of the ECHR (right to
a fair trial) on the basis of the failure of the highest Italian court to provide a state-
ment of reasons for its refusal to request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU despite
requests from the parties.117 A request from one of the parties is, however, unimport-
ant from the perspective of EU law, because the CJEU famously ruled in CILFIT
112 Ibid. at para 111.
113 The ECtHR applied the Bosphorus presumption in Povse, because the Austrian Supreme Court made a
reference. The ECtHR did, however, not examine whether the requested ruling also paid sufficient at-
tention to fundamental rights, as the applicants argued: see Povse, supra n 96 at paras 65 and 77.
Likewise, the ECtHR applied the presumption in Mayenne even though the French Council of State had
not requested a preliminary ruling from the CJEU. The difficulty with this (short) decision declaring the
complaint inadmissible is that the ECtHR does not conduct a substantive analysis of its Bosphorus crite-
ria: see Mayenne, supra n 94 at para 5. See also Lock, ‘Beyond Bosphorus: The European Court of
Human Rights’ Case Law on the Responsibility of Member States of International Organisations under
the European Convention on Human Rights’, (2010) 10 Human Rights Law Review 529 at 529–45,
540–1; Lock, supra n 19 at 204.
114 Article 267(3) TFEU obliges courts or tribunals ‘against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy’ to
refer when they have doubts about the the interpretation and validity of EU law. Such a reference is not
required if a question on EU law is not relevant for the outcome of the dispute, if the point of EU law
has already been dealt with by the CJEU (acte e´claire´) or if the correct application of EU law ‘may be so
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt’ (acte clair).
115 This is understandable because the ECtHR generally does not examine the correctness of the way in
which national courts dealt with their obligation to refer, since this would mean that it expresses itself
upon the interpretation and application of EU law: see Bosphorus, supra n 1 at para 43; Dhahbi v Italy
Application No 17120/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 8 April 2014, at para 31.
116 In Ferreira da Silva¸ the CJEU, for example, hinted at a breach of Article 267 TFEU by the highest
Portuguese court: see C-160/14 Ferreira da Silva, 9 September 2015.
117 Dhahbi, supra n 115; Schipani and Others v Italy Application No 38369/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction,
21 July 2015.
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that Article 267 of the TFEU ‘does not constitute a means of redress available to the
parties to a case’.118 On the contrary, it is entirely a court-to-court procedure, which
is ‘completely independent of any initiative by the parties’.119 The reliance by the
ECtHR on the request thus seems to run counter to the way in which the CJEU con-
strues the preliminary reference procedure.120
Interestingly, the ECtHR also held that it performs the Dhahbi test on the basis
of the criteria and CILFIT exceptions developed by the CJEU, while it conducts the
Bosphorus test ‘in accordance with conditions which it has itself laid down’.121 By ex-
plicitly referring to its own conditions in relation to Bosphorus, the ECtHR seems to
affirm that it is essentially up to the Strasbourg Court to determine whether the EU
legal system is indeed equivalent. The ECtHR is thus showing its teeth with this
rhetoric. At the same time, the Bosphorus test as applied in Avotin¸s shows that the
ECtHR’s bark is worse than its bite, because the procedural criterion was applied less
strictly than in earlier Bosphorus cases.
(iii) Rebuttal presumption of equivalent protection: mutual trust and protection in
the applicant’s case
Before determining whether the protection of fundamental rights was manifestly de-
ficient in the Avotin¸s’ case, the Grand Chamber made some general remarks regard-
ing mutual trust. This is one of the most interesting and important parts in Avotin¸s,
especially because the absence of a reference to this constitutional principle in the ac-
cession agreement was one of the more principled reasons for the CJEU to halt the
EU’s accession to the ECHR. Avotin¸s underscores once more that the ECtHR re-
mains willing to also (indirectly) scrutinize EU measures based on mutual recogni-
tion and mutual trust as it did earlier in M.S.S. and Tarakhel.122 The ECtHR was
obviously aware of the sensitivities its willingness causes and explicitly mentioned
that it is ‘mindful of the importance’ of mutual recognition mechanisms and mutual
trust.123 At the same time, the ECtHR held that those mechanisms must not infringe
fundamental rights.124 It is in the context of the latter that the ECtHR made a crucial
118 Case C-283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415 at para 9.
119 Case C210/06 Cartesio, 16 December 2008, at para 90. See also Broberg, ‘Preliminary References as a
Right – but for Whom? The Extent to which Preliminary Reference Decisions Can be Subject to
Appeal’ (2011) 36 European Law Review 276.
120 The implication of this is that national courts are required to pay more attention to parties’ requests
than before because they have to explicitly address such requests, at least when they are specific and per-
tinent. Some authors even claim that this comes close to recognition by the ECtHR that a reference for
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123 Avotin¸s, supra n 1 at para 113.
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point, which seems to have received almost no attention in the initial enthusiasm
that the ECtHR maintained the Bosphorus doctrine.125 It is also in relation to this
point that the implicit Strasbourg criticism of Opinion 2/13 can be seen. Given the
importance of this part of the judgment it is worthwhile reproducing it in full:
However, it is apparent that the aim of effectiveness pursued by some of the
methods used results in the review of the observance of fundamental rights
being tightly regulated or even limited. Hence, the CJEU stated recently in
Opinion 2/13 that “when implementing EU law, the Member States may,
under EU law, be required to presume that fundamental rights have been
observed by the other Member States, so that . . ., save in exceptional cases,
they may not check whether that other Member State has actually, in a specific
case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU” . . . Limiting to
exceptional cases the power of the State in which recognition is sought to re-
view the observance of fundamental rights by the State of origin of the judg-
ment could, in practice, run counter to the requirement imposed by the
Convention according to which the court in the State addressed must at least
be empowered to conduct a review commensurate with the gravity of any ser-
ious allegation of a violation of fundamental rights in the State of origin, in
order to ensure that the protection of those rights is not manifestly deficient.126
The ECtHR subsequently used two further paragraphs to state more or less the
same albeit in slightly different words. The conclusion is thus that national court
judges cannot refrain from examining fundamental rights complaints ‘on the sole
ground that they are applying EU law’.127
It is remarkable that the ECtHR uses such blunt language. It chose, for example,
not to mention that Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation requires domestic
courts to refuse to recognize a judgment when the rights of defence are not effect-
ively respected.128 In addition, the ECtHR only referred explicitly to recitals 16 and
17 of the Brussels I Regulation which underscore the necessity of automatically rec-
ognizing such judgments. In doing so, the ECtHR seemed to suggest that there is no
room for fundamental rights considerations in the Brussels I Regulation, despite the
fact that recital 18 addresses this explicitly.129 The ECtHR could have chosen a more
reconciliatory tone in its judgment by, for example, anchoring its considerations
more explicitly in EU law itself. More specifically, the ECtHR could have stressed
that the CJEU has given national courts room to deviate from the automatic charac-
ter required by mutual trust in order to protect fundamental rights in the, albeit
125 Requejo, ‘Avotins v. Latvia: Presumption of Equivalent Protection not Rebutted’, ConflictofLaws.net, 24
May 2016, available at: conflictoflaws.net/2016/avotins-v-latvia-presumption-of-equivalent-protection-
not-rebutted/ [last accessed 2 December 2016].
126 Avotin¸s, supra n 1 at para 114.
127 Ibid. at para 116.
128 See C-283/05 ASML Netherlands BV v SEMIS [2006] ECR I-12041 at para 20.
129 ‘However, respect for the rights of the defence means that the defendant should be able to appeal in an
adversarial procedure, against the declaration of enforceability, if he considers one of the grounds for
non-enforcement to be present. Redress procedures should also be available to the claimant where his
application for a declaration of enforceability has been rejected.’
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different policy area, of criminal law and the EAW.130 One potential explanation for
the ECtHR’s reticence is that references to those fundamental rights considerations
might give the impression that there was discretion for national courts, even though,
as argued above, this was not the case.131
The ECtHR was further rather critical when contemplating whether the presump-
tion of equivalent protection could be rebutted. In Bosphorus, it discussed this matter
in only one paragraph and found that the presumption could not be rebutted, with
reference to the nature of and general interest pursued by the interference and a rele-
vant CJEU ruling.132 In two of the four cases in which the ECtHR also applied the
doctrine in an EU-related case, Kokkelvisserij and Povse, it examined the possibility of
rebuttal somewhat more elaborately, but in neither judgment was the EU criticized
in any way nor was there any indication that protection had not been up to
scratch.133 Although the ECtHR eventually also concluded in Avotin¸s that the pre-
sumption could not be rebutted, it needed no less than nine paragraphs to arrive at
that conclusion and, for the first time, came close to concluding that protection had
been manifestly deficient.134
Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation is again of great relevance here; in par-
ticular, the rule that a judgment (which should, in principle, not be recognized) can
be recognized nevertheless when the defendant could have challenged the judgment
but did not. Considering that the applicant failed to appeal the Cypriot judgment,
the question was whether he had the possibility thereto. The Latvian courts neither
answered this question nor the question of the burden of proof with regard to the ex-
istence and availability of appeal, even though Article 6(1) of the ECHR required
them to verify these matters, according to the Court.135 Instead, they simply assumed
that the burden of proof lay with the applicant or that appealing was possible.136
This approach could, according to the ECtHR, ‘in theory’ lead to the finding that the
protection of the applicant’s defence rights had been manifestly deficient.137
However, in the specific circumstances of the applicant’s case, the ECtHR did not
make this finding.138 It was possible for the ECtHR to criticize the Latvian courts for
not verifying whether the applicant could have appealed the Cypriot judgment and
for not answering the question of the burden of proof, even though these courts had
no discretion, because the domestic courts did not carefully establish the factual cir-
cumstances that determined which of the two options in Article 34(2) of the
Brussels I Regulation they had to choose.
Although the ECtHR criticized the domestic courts, and not the EU, and al-
though it eventually avoided concluding that there was no equivalent protection, it
showed its willingness to scrutinize carefully decisions of domestic courts
130 C-404/15, C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi en Caldararu, 5 April 2016.
131 See Section 4.B.ii of this article.
132 Bosphorus, supra n 2 at para 166.
133 Kokkelvisserij, supra n 95; Povse supra n 96 at paras 84–87.
134 Avotin¸s, supra n 1 at para 117–125.
135 Ibid. at para 121.
136 Ibid. at paras 120–121.
137 Ibid. at para 121.
138 Ibid. at paras 122–123. (because the applicant could have appealed and was himself responsible for
inquiring as to the remedies available in Cyprus after he became aware of the judgment).
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implementing EU law (as in the Dhahbi/Schipani line of cases), even when they do
not have discretion. Considering the important role of domestic courts in the EU
legal system—for example, because they provide remedies to individuals for breaches
of EU law139—the ECtHR’s careful scrutiny may be interpreted as a signal that the
presumption of equivalent protection should not be taken as a given. In sum, the
ECtHR again barked when stating that, in theory, the presumption could be rebutted
because the protection was manifestly deficient—something which it has never con-
cluded before. It however did not bite, because it eventually upheld the presumption
in the applicant’s case.140
5. CONCLUSION
The examination of the recent developments that govern the relationship between
the two highest European courts since Opinion 2/13 paints a mixed picture. The
strictness of the ECtHR in Avotin¸s depends very much on the part under consider-
ation. On the one hand, the ECtHR rather easily assumes that the EU legal system
offers equivalent protection and downplays the necessity for national courts to re-
quest a preliminary ruling from the CJEU. On the other hand, the ECtHR is stricter
when it comes to the question whether the presumption that equivalent protection
in the case at hand existed can be rebutted because the protection was manifestly de-
ficient and on the specific point of mutual trust. The implicit reaction of the ECtHR
to Opinion 2/13 can be seen in the latter two points: the ECtHR clarifies that the au-
tonomy of EU law is not unlimited and it can, therefore, be concluded that the
ECtHR seems to apply the Bosphorus doctrine somewhat more strictly than before
Opinion 2/13 in comparison with the handful of judgments in which it dealt with the
doctrine previously. Furthermore, it seems that the ECtHR wanted to show its dis-
satisfaction with Opinion 2/13, but without entering into open warfare. A similar con-
clusion can be drawn from the way in which Luxembourg has dealt with the ECHR
and the case law of the ECtHR. Also, here one can discern a mixed bag with judg-
ments that show a willingness on the part of the CJEU to autonomously interpret
the Charter without regard to Strasbourg (J.N.), while other judgments show consid-
erable respect and comity towards the ECtHR (Aranyosi).
The tone of the dialogue has thus become a bit harsher on both sides, albeit in a
subtle way, for the courts continue to listen, defer, show respect and prevent conflict.
The characterization of the relationship between the two courts before Opinion 2/13
(Section 2.C), therefore, still applies, but should be nuanced. This confirms that, as
was indicated in Section 2.C, they can indeed change their mindset if they so wish.
However, the analysis of the developments also demonstrates that, even in ever com-
plex times and even after the great disappointment that Opinion 2/13 has been to
the ECtHR, the courts have managed to avoid outright conflict. Although the precise
character of the courts’ future relationship will remain uncertain and even though
concerns will continue to exist (Section 2.C), the relationship between the two
139 See Bosphorus, supra n 1 at para 164.
140 See also Johansen, ‘The Bosphorus Presumption Is still Alive and Kicking: the Case of Avotin¸s v. Latvia’
PluriCourts Blog, 24 May 2016, available at: jus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/blog/stian-oby-johansen/
2016-05-24-avotins-v-latvia.html [last accessed 21 December 2016]; Berge´, supra n 89.
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European courts is likely, considering what it has gone through already and what is
at stake, to be resilient in the future too.
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